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SHSU ECONOMICS WORKING PAPER 1 Introduction
Of the approximately 45 million Americans in Medicaid, roughly two-thirds are enrolled
in some sort of managed care. While the speciﬁcs vary across states, generally these
Medicaid participants are enrolled in managed care organizations (MCOs) that are
responsible for providing all of their health care needs. In return, the MCOs receive
from the state a monthly payment for each enrollee, regardless of the costs incurred by
the MCO in providing their care. The goal of the program is to harness the MCOs’
desire to minimize costs to incentivize them to provide high quality care to enrollees.
However, even assuming that the long-run incentives for MCOs to provide high
quality are suﬃciently strong, short-run proﬁt shocks may inﬂuence MCO behavior.
Further, given their contracts with state Medicaid agencies, Medicaid MCOs typically
have limited means by which they can respond to poor proﬁts. Because their revenue
is capitated, the only way the MCOs can increase per-member proﬁts in the short run
is by reducing costs. For instance, the MCOs may be able to exploit economies of
scale by increasing enrollment. However, it is likely diﬃcult for an MCO to increase
enrollment in a relatively short period. A more direct means by which an MCO can
reduce costs is by reducing the amount of services it provides to its enrollees, a practice
known as service stinting.
This paper addresses the question of whether changes in proﬁts inﬂuence the quality
of care provided by Medicaid MCOs. A unique data set is employed that includes
variables that measure the quality provided and the proﬁts earned by each MCO in
each geographic area (hereafter referred to as service delivery area, or SDA) in which
it operates. Quality is deﬁned here as the provision of eight types of preventive care
received by enrollees. The types of care include screenings for children and women and
the provision of asthma medications to those diagnosed as asthmatic. The data also
include variables that control for demographic characteristics of enrollees, such as race
1and gender. These data are then matched to ﬁnancial measures for each MCO in each
SDA that it serves.
Surprisingly, there has been scant research into whether the proﬁts earned by MCOs
have an eﬀect on the quality of care that they provide. The only existing studies (to
the authors’ knowledge) involve commercial, rather than Medicaid, MCOs. One of
these papers1 ﬁnds that higher MCO proﬁts are associated with higher quality of care
in the following year, while the othersscbs2005 ﬁnds that including ﬁnancial measures
of HMOs does not alter the eﬀects of ownership status on quality of care.
This paper adds to the existing literature in a number of signiﬁcant dimensions.
First, the use of panel data allows for an analysis of the eﬀects of changes in proﬁts,
holding time-invariant factors constant. Earlier research on this topic is limited mostly
to cross-sectional analyses, which may be subject to issues of simultaneity. Second,
the data are disaggregated to the MCO-SDA level. As the operating environment may
diﬀer across the various regions within an MCO’s service area, data at the MCO-SDA
level can capture these potential diﬀerences in a way that studies performed at the
MCO level cannot. Finally, as mentioned above, there is a dearth of research on this
topic. Only two published papers have analyzed this question, and those are limited
to commercial MCOs. This paper adds to the general literature on MCOs and may
provide insights into Medicaid MCOs. This sector is important not only because of
the large number of individuals who depend on Medicaid MCOs for their health care,
but also because of the vulnerable nature of this population.
2 Methods
2.1 Data
The data is based on a large, diverse state with over 1.5 million Medicaid managed
2care enrollees. The sample covers the period July 2003 through July 2006. The unit of
observation is at the MCO-SDA-quarter level. The data cover nine MCOs and seven
SDAs (most MCOs operate in multiple SDAs).
2.2 Study measures
The dependent variables used in the analysis are based on preventive health services
utilization. These measures are among those deﬁned in the Health Plan Employer Data
and Information Set (HEDIS) speciﬁcation system.3 The services analyzed fall into
three categories: child health screenings, women’s health screenings, and the provision
of asthma medications to those displaying symptoms of asthma. The child health
screenings are broken down by the child’s age: prenatal, less than 15 months, three to
six years, and twelve to twenty-one years. The two women’s screenings analyzed are
post partum and breast cancer. Finally, the measures for asthma medications are for
individuals ﬁve to nine years of age and ten to seventeen years of age.
The dependent variable employed below is an aggregation of the individual level
data. Speciﬁcally, the dependent variable is the proportion of individuals in that
subgroup (e.g., child less than 15 months of age) that received the appropriate care
from that MCO in that SDA during the previous twelve months. Table 1 describes the
eight compliance rates analyzed. Prenatal screenings have the highest compliance rate
in the sample, while well-child screenings for children aged 12 to 21 have the lowest.
The sample is limited by a number of restrictions. First, the observations for one
of the MCOs were excluded because it entered the SDA roughly half way through the
sample period and had extremely low compliance rates in the few periods for which
the rates are available. Likewise, another MCO left an SDA one year into the sample
period and was thus excluded. Also, the MCO-SDA was not included if the number of
eligible members of the subgroup was less than 10. Further, the compliance rates are
3based only on those with a CRG of one.4 Another important restriction is that those
enrollees who do not have a relatively stable membership in the MCO are not included
in the sample. The HEDIS measures apply to only those who have been enrolled in
that MCO for eleven of the previous twelve months.
The explanatory variable of primary interest is the proﬁt of the MCO. In the state
in question, Medicaid MCOs are required to report to the state insurance commissioner
their ﬁnancial data, by both product line (e.g., commercial, Medicaid) and geographic
area (SDA). The speciﬁc proﬁt measure used below is the net income or loss on un-
derwriting activities. This measure reﬂects the operating proﬁts of the MCO and does
not include investment income or capital gains or losses. The regressions below are
estimated using proﬁts for both Medicaid operations only and for all of the MCO’s
product lines. Table 2 summarizes these data. Across all of the observations, the
mean underwriting gain is slightly less than $4 per member per month (PMPM) for
Medicaid operations and slightly greater than $3 PMPM for all operations. Table 2
also indicates that these proﬁts vary signiﬁcantly in the sample.
The remaining explanatory variables control for demographic characteristics of the
eligible HEDIS population. These variables include the percentage of the population
by age, race, and rural residence location and are summarized for three of the HEDIS
measures in Table 3.
2.3 Statistical analysis
There are a number of complications in estimating the speciﬁed model. The ﬁrst is
due to the fact that proﬁts would likely only inﬂuence preventive care with a lag. There
are at least two reasons for the delayed response. The ﬁrst arises from the information
delay faced by MCO administrators. As ﬁnancial results are only known with a lag
(especially as the time period used in the analysis below is relatively frequent quarterly
4data), the MCO cannot adjust its behavior until those results are available. Second, it
is likely that a response by an MCO to proﬁt information could only be implemented
with a lag. To allow for these delayed eﬀects, proﬁts enter the model lagged one and
two quarters.
Another complication is due to how the HEDIS compliance rates are measured.
These measures are based on the provision of the service over the previous twelve
months. Thus, the eﬀects of changes in the explanatory variables will be muted, as
eﬀects due to changes in this quarter will only aﬀect those individuals who were due
to receive their preventive care in that quarter. To account for the slow movement of
the compliance rate and the resulting potential for serial correlation in the error terms,
the estimating equation is estimated in ﬁrst diﬀerences.
Two regressions are estimated for each HEDIS measure: one based on the proﬁts
from all of the MCO’s operations and one based on the proﬁts from only the MCO’s
Medicaid operations. The error terms in the regressions clustered at the MCO-SDA
level to account for the possibility that the error terms within each MCO-SDA are
not independent.5 The observations are weighted by the number of individuals in the
subgroup being analyzed.
3 Results
3.1 Eﬀects of proﬁts
The coeﬃcients of the proﬁt terms from the regression analysis are displayed in
Table 4. The ﬁrst column indicates the dependent variable for that regression. The
next three columns correspond to the regression where the proﬁts from all of the MCO’s
operations is used as the explanatory variable, while the ﬁnal three columns are the
coeﬃcients from the regressions when the proﬁt variable is based only the MCO’s
5Medicaid operations. The “Total” columns are the sum of the coeﬃcients of the two
lags of income. This value can be thought of as the eﬀect of a sustained $1 increase in
PMPM income over two quarters.
A comparison of the results from the two proﬁt measures suggest that the results
diﬀer little whether the proﬁts are those from all product lines or only Medicaid opera-
tions. For four of the eight compliance rates, the sign of the total eﬀects across the two
proﬁt measures are the same. While the signs diﬀer for the remaining four compliance
rates, the total eﬀects are close to zero.
The most striking aspect of the results is the lack of statistical and economic sig-
niﬁcance of the estimates. At a 95% conﬁdence level, the only regression in which
the proﬁt variable is statistically signiﬁcant is asthma for those aged 10 to 17. How-
ever, this eﬀect is only statistically signiﬁcant for income from all operations. In terms
of economic signiﬁcance, the average standard deviation of MCO income across the
MCO-SDA combinations is $10. Thus, given the total eﬀect estimate of 0.100, a one-
standard deviation increase in MCO proﬁts is associated with a 1 point increase in the
compliance rate. Given the sample mean compliance rate for this HEDIS measure is
50, the economic signiﬁcance of this eﬀect is minimal.
Not only is the economic signiﬁcance of overall proﬁts in the asthma (ages 10 to 17)
regression limited, there is even less economic signiﬁcance of either proﬁt measure in
all of the other regressions. Outside of the asthma (ages 10 to 17) compliance rate, the
next largest estimate of the total eﬀect from proﬁts is only one-third of the magnitude.
In summary, it appears that changes in MCO proﬁts do not lead to changes in levels
of preventive care. However, a possible confounding inﬂuence is the eﬀect of changes in
expenditures on eﬀorts to increase preventive care utilization. For instance, an increase
in outreach expenditures could be correlated with an increase in later preventive care
utilization. Given the increased expenditures would lead to decreased proﬁts, this
would lead to a negative relationship between proﬁts and preventive care utilization.
6While the available data preclude a direct analysis of the eﬀect of outreach expen-
ditures, there are at least two factors that mitigate the concern over their inﬂuence
on the results. First, outreach expenditures likely constitute a small proportion of
expenditures. While the exact level of outreach expenditures are not reported in the
data, they fall under Administration and Other Expenses. Administration and Other
Expenses comprise on average only 15% of all expenses. Given outreach expenditures
likely make up only a small fraction of Administration and Other Expenses, one would
expect these expenditures to only slightly aﬀect overall proﬁts. Second, an additional
set of regressions were estimated where the overall MCO proﬁts were replaced by Ad-
ministration and Other Expenditures. If the eﬀects of outreach expenditures aﬀected
the overall relationship between proﬁts and preventive care, one would expect a po-
tentially negative association between Administration and Other Expenses and the
HEDIS measures. However, only one measure (Cervical Cancer Screening) displayed a
statistically negative association with these expenses. While it is impossible to reach
a deﬁnitive conclusion, it appears unlikely that the eﬀects of outreach expenditures
negates the hypothesized impact of MCOs reacting to past proﬁt levels.
3.2 Eﬀects of other explanatory variables
Table 5 provides the coeﬃcient estimates for the remaining explanatory variables.
Each column corresponds to the regression for the compliance rate listed in the header,
while each row corresponds to an explanatory variable included in the analysis. The
results listed in this table correspond to the regressions where overall MCO proﬁts is
used as the proﬁt measure.
The number of total enrollees appears to have a largely positive eﬀect on the com-
pliance rates. Of the four statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients, three are positive and
are of a greater magnitude than the lone negative coeﬃcient. Conversely, the coeﬃ-
7cients on the number of Medicaid enrollees are all statistically indistinguishable from
zero. These results suggest that increases in the number of commercial and other
non-Medicaid enrollees have positive spillovers to Medicaid enrollees.
Gender appears to play an important role in the asthmatic compliance rates. In-
creases in the percent of male individuals in the HEDIS population lead to relatively
large and highly statistically signiﬁcant decreases in the compliance rate. Recall that
compliance for this measure requires two things to occur: the doctor has to prescribe
the appropriate medicine and the prescription must be ﬁlled. As such, it is not pos-
sible to determine whether the negative eﬀect of the percent of males is due to the
prescriptions not being made, not being ﬁlled, or some combination of the two.
In terms of racial eﬀects, increases in the percent of Hispanic enrollees are asso-
ciated with increases in two of the four child screenings compliance rate and in the
breast cancer compliance rate. These results are consistent with earlier ﬁndings of a
“Hispanic paradox”, whereby Hispanics tend to have better health outcomes than their
socioeconomic characteristics would otherwise predict.6,7 However, the exceptions to
these results are negative coeﬃcients in the asthma (ages 5 to 9) and post-partum
compliance rates. This negative eﬀect on the postpartum compliance is also present
for the percent black variable. The percent black variable also has a negative eﬀect
on the prenatal compliance rate. Taken together, these ﬁndings suggest a need for
outreach to black and Hispanic mothers for increased preventive care before and after
pregnancy.
4 Discussion
This paper examines data on Medicaid MCOs to determine if the quality of care
that they provide is aﬀected by changes in their proﬁts. The results of the analysis
indicate that no such linkage exists. Rather, the provision of preventive care appears
8to increase with the number total MCO enrollees. Also, increases in the percent of
male enrollees tends to lead to decreases in the use asthma medicine among young
people, while increases in the percent of Hispanic and black enrollees is associated with
decreased levels of postpartum care.
There are at least two broad explanations for why MCOs do not adjust quality
in response to changes in proﬁts. First, MCOs may not believe changing quality in
response to changes in proﬁts maximizes proﬁts. MCOs may view the potential short-
run gains from cutting back on preventive services as being outweighed by the long-
run costs. These costs could include the loss of current members and perhaps future
members due to negative perceptions among consumers. Another potentially important
cost is the loss of bonus payments from the state for not meeting the speciﬁed HEDIS
criteria set forth in the MCO’s contracts with the state. In the state in question, if the
MCO earns proﬁts in excess of a reasonable amount (as deﬁned by the state agency), the
MCO can keep a portion of those proﬁts as long as it meets certain quality thresholds
put forth in the contract. Furthermore, one percent of the capitation payments that
the MCO receives from the state are held in escrow. If the MCO does not meet the
performance objectives, the escrow amount is returned to the state.
A second broad explanation for these results may be that MCOs simply do not
have the ability to aﬀect short-run changes in preventive care in response to changes in
proﬁts. For example, doctors in the MCO’s network may not be inﬂuenced by MCOs
when providing preventive care to members. Further, the state in question has a num-
ber of programs that are designed to ensure that Medicaid recipients receive preventive
care. One such program allows for doctors to be reimbursed for well child visits even
if they are not the member’s primary care physician. These types of programs may
counteract any attempts by MCOs to alter their costs by trying to change the extent
of preventive care.
There are a number of extensions that could provide additional insight into these
9issues. For instance, while MCO proﬁts are used in this paper, an analysis of the eﬀect
of doctors’ proﬁts could be very illuminating. Doctors in the MCO networks are the
gatekeepers of care, and changes in their proﬁts may have an impact on the quality
of care that they provide. Also, it would be interesting to investigate whether MCO
proﬁts aﬀect other types of services, such as diagnostic services or hospital lengths of
stay. Given these services are typically far more costly than preventive care, additional
incentives may exist for MCOs to inﬂuence the provision of these types of care.
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11Table 1: Summary Statistics - HEDIS Compliance Rates
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Asthma, Ages 5 - 9 141 47.0 9.7 21.4 80.0
Asthma, Ages 10 - 17 143 51.8 8.5 33.3 84.4
Prenatal 144 80.8 10.6 47.6 91.1
Well Child Visits, Ages 0 - 15 mths 132 41.6 11.1 2.5 60.4
Well Child Visits, Ages 3-6 144 61.6 6.7 29.1 71.3
Well Child Visits, Ages 12-21 144 39.9 7.2 19.7 54.7
Breast Cancer 137 44.1 11.4 16.7 75.9
Post Partum 144 53.0 5.6 32.0 60.5
12Table 2: Summary Statistics - Underwriting Gains/Losses (PMPM)
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Medicaid Operations 144 $3.84 $8.06 $-17.77 $40.00
All Operations 144 $3.19 $9.75 $-27.22 $48.23
13Table 3: Summary Statistics - Demographic Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Well-Child Visits (3-6 years) (N=144)
# Eligible 6175 3465 1126 14553
Male 50.1 0.7 48.3 52.5
White 11.9 6.6 2.8 28.0
Black 15.7 9.3 0.9 29.5
Hispanic 70.7 13.6 47.9 95.9
Other 1.8 1.2 0.1 4.1
Rural 5.7 9.0 0.1 35.6
Breast Cancer Screenings (N=137)
# Eligible 129 117 11 483
White 33.6 13.6 12.9 75.0
Black 20.6 14.9 0.8 56.9
Hispanic 33.2 25.2 0.0 83.1
Other 12.7 8.9 0.0 42.9
Rural 9.4 16.5 0.0 78.6
Asthma Medication (5-9 years) (N=141)
# Eligible 105 59 15 266
Male 42.9 6.5 20 57.7
White 13.7 8.6 0 38.1
Black 27.2 16.5 0.0 71.4
Hispanic 57.2 20.9 17.1 100.0
Other 1.8 2.1 0.0 9.4
Rural 5.6 9.4 0.0 44.7
14Table 4: Eﬀect of a Sustained $1 pmpm Increase in HMO
Total and Medicaid Proﬁts on HEDIS Compliance Rates
Dependent Variable: Total Proﬁts Medicaid Proﬁts
HEDIS Compliance Rate t-1 t-2 Total t-1 t-2 Total
Asthma, Ages 5 - 9
.071 -.031 .040 .001 .005 .006
(.077) (.064) (1.33) (.051) (.039) (0.08)
Asthma, Ages 10 - 17
.200* -.093 .107** .126 -.055 .071
(.097) (.059) (4.46) (.094) (.054) (1.70)
Pre-natal
.048 -.019 .029* .029 -.007 .023
(.028) (.018) (4.48) (.022) (.012) (2.71)
Well-Child Visits .009 -.021* -.011 .016 -.010 .006
Ages 0 - 15 months (.023) (.011) (0.73) (.025) (.014) (0.13)
Well-Child Visits -.011 .013 .002 -.013 .005 -.008
Ages 3 - 6 years (.018) (.010) (0.02) (.015) (.008) (0.41)
Well-Child Visits -.003 .003 .000 -.025 .019 -.006
Ages 12 - 21 years (.019) (.013) ( 0.00) (.018) (.013) (0.37)
Breast Cancer Screening
.012 -.038 -.026 -.025 .036 .011
(.090) (.049) (0.20) (.077) (.040) (0.05)
Post-Partum
-.009 -.006 -.015 -.017 -.009 -.027*
(.019) (.010) (1.03) (.014) (.007) (3.87)
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Regressions are estimated in ﬁrst-diﬀerences. Standard errors clustered by MCO
and SDA are reported in parentheses. Additional explanatory variables include
percentage of enrollees by race, rural residence, and gender (where applicable).
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